# WORK-OVER OPERATIONS

# PULLING UPPER COMPLETION STRING

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## "SHARING TO BE BETTER"

Under the direction of Norwegian Oil and Gas, a joint industry task force of Operator and Drilling Contractor personnel has been formed to recommend ways to reduce the number and potential severity of well control events on the NCS.

• One team recommendation was communicating actual well control incidents that have recently occurred on the NCS so lessons are shared and understood.

• This is the tenth in a series of case histories. The incident highlights the importance of appreciating and realizing that an incident seldom develops on a single cause. The lesson shows that a number of issues had to be addressed and mitigated.

• Please take some time to review this case history with the drilling crew and discuss the questions raised during the presentation. Please invite and encourage related drilling service personnel to participate.

• It is hoped that sharing of incidents is helpful and any feedback is welcome.

**"SHARING TO BE SAFER"** 





### ABBREVIATIONS

- BSR: blind shear rams
- C&K: choke & kill
- DHPG: down-hole pressure gauge
- EXP-BP: Expandable bridge plug
- HCSFH: Heave Compensated Surface Flow-Head
- HGR: hanger
- L-GLM: lower gas lift mandrel
- L-LV: lower lubricator valve
- LND STR: landing string
- LVs: lubricator valves
- MD: measured depth
- ML: mud line
- PCE: pressure containment equipment
- PKR: packer
- RKB: rotary kelly bushing
- RSR: riser
- SSCSV: subsurface controlled safety valve
- SSTT: subsea test tree
- TBG: tubing
- TDS: top drive system
- U-GLM: upper gas lift mandrel
- U-LV: upper lubricator valve
- VD: vertical depth
- WH: well head
- XT: X-mas tree



Note: drawing not in scale



















Note: drawing not in scale









#### **INVESTIGATION FINDINGS, LEARNING & CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

#### Well Barrier Status

Minimum of 2 barriers were always present: Tubing Hanger envelop and/or BOP stack tested (proper space out) and/or deep-set mechanical barrier fully tested and/or completion/kill fluid (experienced later contaminated)

#### Shear Rams activation event

The presumed well control situation was addressed immediately without hesitation.

Proper space-out was planned/performed: string sheared correctly and well secured successfully.

#### DIRECT CAUSE : INTERNAL STRING BARRIER ACTIVATION - U-tubing effect and troubleshooting management

Internal string barriers were not activated: preparation was not made to effectively utilize the two (2) Lubricator valves and/or the two (2) Sub-Sea test tree valves during pulling out and laying down of landing string components.

Recommended Corrective Action:

- Maintain control umbilical's to valves (barriers) and assign responsibilities for activation.
- Structure Tool Box Talks and handovers to include the well status, barrier diagrams and barriers in place (discuss "what-if" scenario) that can be activated.
- Well Barrier Diagrams must be prepared and used as a verification tool representing the barriers available.

#### ROOT CAUSE: NON HOMOGENEOUS FLUID - Well bullhead and displacement inadequate

A homogenous fluid was not through out the entire wellbore. Residual hydrocarbons were still present in the well resulting in fluid barrier being degraded. Contaminated brine was observed at surface once the wash train was circulated out of hole. Further circulation of the entire wellbore following setting of the deep set barrier is needed to confirm a clean homogenous fluid throughout the wellbore.

Recommended Corrective Action:

- Revise bull-head program/sequence to reduce the time from completion of pumping operations and setting of the deep barrier,

- Revise procedures to adequately circulate the well and use the observed returns (density, contamination and in balance fluid column) as guidance to ensure a homogenous fluid is an effective barrier.